

AFRICA'S DISAPPEARING ELECTION RESULTS¹

Why announcing the winner is simply not enough

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ABSTRACT

In many African countries releasing election results means simply revealing the winners and losers and publicising their percentage of the national vote. This norm makes it very difficult for researchers interested in studying African elections to collect detailed election data and for citizens to evaluate the validity of the results. This article describes the difficulties associated with collecting sub-national election results in a select set of West African countries, explores some of the potential reasons for these difficulties, argues for an alteration in the status quo and pushes election observers and scholars to demand more of African electoral commissions.

INTRODUCTION

Election results are vanishing in many African countries. Though the exact moment of the disappearance varies from case to case, the trick occurs some time between the casting of ballots and the reporting of winners. Individual voters know who they rewarded with their ballot and the ultimate victors and vanquished are written into the historical record. How the former flows into the latter is largely a mystery because results at polling station level and other intermediary sub-national units are hidden from public view and often expunged from electoral records altogether. Though the losing parties sometimes mourn the loss of this data in the local press, for the most part the missing information goes unnoticed, both domestically and internationally.

1 Observations in Ghana were made as a result of a 2004/5 Fulbright-Hays fellowship. Ghana's Center for Democratic Development assisted with the research that ultimately led to this paper. The author would like to thank Fredline M' Cormack-Hale and Arthur Hollist for pointing him towards data in the Sierra Leonean case and Abubakar Alhassan for help on the Nigerian case. Participants at the American Political Science Association's Accra 2009 Workshop made helpful comments on an alternative draft of this paper, as did the *Journal of African Elections'* anonymous reviewers. All faults with the paper, however, lie solely with the author.

A great deal of pomp accompanies a typical election. Visit a polling station in the early morning hours to witness the official opening of the ballot boxes, revealing to polling station workers, party representatives, and domestic and international election monitors their contents – usually consisting of makeshift privacy screens, full colour ballot papers, voters' rolls, ink pads, and necessary office supplies. Show up at odd times throughout the day to see a queue of voters waiting their turn to present state-sanctioned identity cards to the station attendant to have them crosschecked with the official electoral commission roll.

As voters make their way through the polling station they receive a ballot with a stamp on the back to mark it as official, have their designated fingers marked with indelible ink to discourage the casting of multiple ballots, register their vote behind a privacy screen, and finally deposit the ballot paper in the proper hermetically sealed receptacle.

At dusk, or later if a judge has extended the voting period, polling stations are turned into counting centres. The ballots are removed from their boxes for all interested parties to see, placed in piles according to the marked candidate, counted, and tallied in the official register, to be sent to the regional and then national capitals for aggregation. There the votes are added to others, trickle slowly onto giant chalkboards in the capital city, and eventually find their way into the dailies.

The election-day pageantry and its immediate aftermath have a purpose. Ostensibly, this purpose is transparency, and the resultant 'free and fair election' tag. An amalgamation of international election observers in collaboration with domestic election administrators created this electoral script with its *raison d'être* the legitimization of the ensuing democratically-elected regime (Elklit & Svensson 1997; Schedler 2002).

That this wrought legitimacy might somehow be perverted from its intended mission is, by itself, rather unremarkable. Scholarship focusing on African reinterpretations of the 'state' and 'market' is legion.² The image of a Western institution floundering in the tropical African heat only to be discovered upon closer inspection to be meticulously managed to benefit some corrupt political patron, though it might often be true to form, has become something of a cliché in the sub-field of African political studies (Mbembe 2001).

Certainly, there is some manipulation of elections going on in a handful of Africa countries by insecure leaders seeking the cachet that comes with the mantle of president without the uncertainty that accompanies actual competition. To reduce the unfortunate trend of disappearing results to simple and blatant electoral

2 Texts fitting into this category vary tremendously in both methods applied and theoretical vantage points. Examples are Bates (1981); Bayart (1993); Herbst (2000); Hyden (1980); Mamdani (1996); Young (1994).

malpractice, however, would be to paint over the many nuances of the problem. There are cases, perhaps even the majority of cases, where the officially reported outcome of an election represents the will of the people. Yet here too the votes from villages and neighbourhoods are often swept out of public view. The reasons for this disappearing act are not reported, but the problem is so ubiquitous those engaging in the sleight of hand can do so comfortably within the norm.

THE PROBLEM

In a study I did on Ghanaian political parties and their social foundations I found it useful to look at detailed election results. When these results were analysed alongside available census data I got a pretty good sense of the impact of certain demographic characteristics on a district's partisan proclivities (Fridy 2007). Hoping to apply a similar analysis to Ghana's neighbours to understand better the comparative implications of my research, I set out to compile a comprehensive data set of West African elections at the sub-national level from the late colonial period through to the present.

Cost-effective channels such as the Internet and Interlibrary Loan proved occasionally fruitful, though ultimately unsatisfying. The Internet yields the national results, the names of winners and losers, and hints at the units in which sub-national data might be recorded (Nunley 2004). Texts obtained through Interlibrary Loan are more hit-or-miss. Given only a document's title it is quite difficult to deduce whether or not election results will be reported in an interior table. Occasionally a needle can be found in these haystacks in the form of sub-national election results from a recent election, in the case of the Internet, and some bygone election, in the case of Interlibrary Loans, but invariably these results are given only at the level of a country's primary or secondary administrative division and not at the most basic polling-station level.

With a bit more investment of time, though still relatively inexpensively, one can contact researchers who were in the field during elections and are, perchance, inclined to collect results or know someone who has done so. As a general rule, unless the project is fresh and unpublished I have found scholars willing to share the information they have collected.

For several of Ghana's pre-Fourth Republic elections I was fortunate enough to stumble upon a scholar who just happened to have unpublished election results in his personal library. More often than not, however, scholars can offer only the name of a colleague at a given country's national university, archives, or electoral

commission who might know where to find the data.³ Though no doubt many of these contacts would pan out if I had several weeks in a country to pursue leads and convince officials the information would not be used for dubious purposes, without this investment telephone calls and e-mails are all too often met with one of two predictable results. If contacts can be tracked down they almost always report that the data are not at their disposal or are completely unavailable. Just as frequently, however, the only response is a disconnected telephone signal or a computer-generated bounce-back e-mail reply.⁴

This leaves only the option of a country visit, which is an expensive proposition for non-residents if there are many cases under consideration, and an uncertain proposition even if they are few. Plane tickets and lodging are luxuries few scholars can dedicate to the extraction of a single piece of information, especially a single piece of information that may not even exist. Funds for such an exploration almost always come as part of a larger and more in-depth research project, where detailed election results are but icing on the cake. Unfortunately, instances such as these are few and far between for individual researchers and the scholarly community has, as yet, made no systematic effort to encourage this type of data collection as a collective endeavour.

These challenges to a researcher affiliated with a university can only be multiplied for the average citizen in these fledgling electoral regimes who has neither the material resources, the esteem in the eyes of the applicable bureaucrats, nor the knowledge of the processes and procedures of government necessary to accomplish such a task. The common man and woman is largely reliant on the goodwill of the electoral commissioners and the tenacity and skill of newspaper reporters and party functionaries to bring detailed election results to light. For one reason or another, these key ingredients have, too often, not come together.

3 For pre-independence elections I had some luck in the case of Ghana at the British National Archives, located at Kew. There I found constituency-level results for elections in 1951, 1954, and 1956. For those searching for colonial election results in francophone and lusophone Africa the *Archives Nationales du France, Section d'Outre-Mer* in Aix-en-Provence, France, and the *Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino* in Lisbon, Portugal, would be good places to start. Unfortunately, national archives in independent Africa were poorly prepared to accept their responsibilities at independence and have been under funded in the decades since. The picture Carotenuto & Luongo (2005) paint of the Kenyan National Archives indicates what scholars face at these institutions; so often, as was the case in Ghana, election results will not be housed there.

4 Several years into a project looking at presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria, utilising these methods, Ghana remains the only country for which I have a complete data set at the constituency level. Nigerian results at the state level are available in fairly credible forms, save for those for the most recent election, but for Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, and Benin not only is at least one election missing from my database but journalistic sources for the sub-national election results I obtained cannot easily be verified by official figures.

POTENTIAL CAUSES

Unintentional Error

Likely reasons for the disappearing data fall into two broad categories, defined by the motives of the electoral agents doing the sanitising of results. In the first category are cases where election administrators want to hide embarrassing discrepancies in their numbers but do not make a concerted effort to bias results systematically.

Though we tend to reify election results with exact counts and percentages followed by multiple decimal places, close elections and their accompanying recounts in countries around the world consistently dent this fiction. Elections, even those that are run efficiently and use state of the art tallying techniques, have a messy underbelly; voters do not always make their intent clear and counts can be imprecise and calculations inaccurate.

In 2005 I was searching for polling-station-level data for three of Ghana's constituencies for all the elections of the Fourth Republic and, if possible, those of previous republics. I wanted to use these results to compare voting patterns at the micro-level. For the 2004 elections I found the data I was looking for – not in the national headquarters in Accra but rather spread around the regional headquarters. Visits to the Ashiedu Keteke Sub-Metro Area, Ashanti Region, and Upper East Region Electoral Commission (EC) headquarters verified this fact.

Though visiting these regional headquarters required a significant outlay of time (it takes the better part of a day to reach the Upper East Region by road from Accra), once there I found the sub-national commissioners both friendly and helpful. When I asked them about data for pre-2004 elections I got a unanimous response. The results, they proclaimed, had been sent to Accra and no copies had been kept at the sub-national offices.

At national headquarters I asked several people about the missing data and person after person told me it did not exist. When I asked why, I was confronted with quizzical stares and then passed along to a superior. As I worked my way higher up the commission's bureaucratic structure I finally discovered someone who knew where the data had gone. In 1996, he divulged, the aggregated numbers at polling station level did not always match the numbers at constituency level. In addition, many of the regions outside Accra did not send a complete set of pre-aggregation paperwork to the capital city.⁵ The experience of 1996 resulted in the EC not even trying to collect and maintain this data in 2000. Though I could get no one to verify this sanitising procedure independently, when confronted

5 Personal interview conducted by author with Electoral Commission employee at Accra headquarters on 25 July 2005.

with the story two of my informant's superiors acknowledged that his story was plausible. None denied that it had happened as he described.

Ghana's EC is one of the most, if not the most respected electoral commissions in Africa. In each of the Fourth Republic's national elections the EC has gazetted constituency-level⁶ results and released these published results to the general public. The EC has been applauded by the international monitoring community and, though the political parties have been known to criticise the conduct of elections when they lose, all parties, opposition and incumbent alike, have adopted the position that the EC is an unbiased observer that should have the final word in declaring winners and losers. Despite this well-earned reputation, election results in Ghana have disappeared.

In Sierra Leone, where the National Electoral Commission (NEC) has overseen fewer elections, the hiding of data was more ham-handed. Following the 2007 elections it looked at first as if the NEC was going to set new standards for transparency in the region. Its website (<http://www.nec-sierraleone.org/>) posted first-round results regularly from every polling station in the country as they rolled in to national headquarters. When all the counting was done scholars interested in studying the results had access to data from each of the country's 6123 polling stations, enabling them to aggregate up to the chiefdom, district, regional, or national levels and down to the village or neighbourhood, as the research question and other variables dictated.

As no presidential candidate passed the constitutionally mandated 55 per cent threshold, a second round was set for a month later. At first it appeared that the NEC was going to continue with the tradition it had set in the first round. It released polling station-level results intermittently and, on 13 September 2007 at 3pm GMT, the vote from 76,1 per cent of the country's polling stations was publicly released.

This release was followed by days of silence. Then, on 17 September 2007 at 9.30am GMT, the NEC released the final results as a summary of the country's 14 districts, declaring Ernest Bai Koroma president, with just under 55 per cent of the vote. The public was informed that '477 stations have been invalidated due to more ballots than registered voters' but polling station-level data for the validated stations would not be made available.

Since I was working with a colleague on a paper that would benefit greatly from this undisclosed data I sent e-mails to the NEC asking it to reconsider, and contacted party agents and newspapers in search of their unofficial counts. While waiting for responses that would never come I returned to the NEC's press release

6 Prior to the 2004 elections Ghana had 200 constituencies. For 2004 and 2008 the number was increased to 230.

and decided to compare results from the first and second rounds to see if the missing second-round data resembled what one would predict, using first-round data as an independent variable. To find out what the missing data contained I took the results from the known 76,1 per cent of polling stations and subtracted that from the total vote. When I went to gather this last bit of data I opened the NEC's PDF-formatted document and highlighted the table displaying presidential vote by district in preparation for a cut-and-paste manoeuvre.

What I found in the highlighted text were a number of invisible columns of data. My prediction was that these data would probably simply be blank columns the authors of the document used to achieve the spacing they desired. When I opened the document in Adobe Photoshop to slide a black background behind the invisible columns what I found was far less mundane. On what looked like empty space NEC officials had, at one time, stored visible columns of numbers (see Figure 1). I shared this formerly hidden data with a few colleagues to see if we could make sense of it.

At first we were perplexed, and the numbers remained a mystery. Then a document purportedly written by the NEC began to circulate throughout the Sierra Leonean Internet community (see Figure 2). In a case lodged in Sierra Leone's High Court by the losing Sierra Leonean People's Party (SLPP) against the NEC and its head, Christiana Thorpe, the document in question was identified as an NEC publication released on 'Thursday, 29th November 2007 or thereabout' to fulfil the commission's reporting duties as outlined in the country's Electoral Laws Act of 2002.⁷ When the document was compared to the hidden columns in the NEC's 17 September press release it becomes obvious that, notwithstanding a few minor typographical and arithmetic discrepancies, the NEC had had all the data used to construct their 29 November document in house for more than two months.

INTENTIONAL ERROR

If unintentional errors are the unfortunate but inevitable price of universal suffrage, intentional errors are but one of the many tools in the superficial democrat's basket of tricks. Persistent citizens, especially those whose preferences lean towards opposition parties, can sometimes succeed in pressuring disingenuous polling agents actually to count the ballots sitting in the ballot boxes. While this does not necessarily remove all methods of rigging, in forcing election officials to count ballots in full sight of the community in which they were

⁷ The SLPP's application to the Sierra Leonean Supreme Court can be found in the *Awareness Times* archives (http://www.news.sl/drwebsite/publish/article_20057226.shtml).

cast, there is a very real incentive for the ballot counters not to report results too far off community expectations. Give figures that are completely out of line with people's perceptions, in terms either of turnout or of preference, and the risk of vigilante justice cannot be excluded. Though it might not ultimately affect election results at the national or constituency level, at least community members will know that their votes were counted.

All too often, however, this citizen-forced democracy is impractical. In Nigeria's 2007 presidential elections, for instance, international observers noted young thugs stuffing ballots into collection boxes and threatening potential voters in queues and at their homes. Others witnessed election officials at collation centres filling out aggregation forms with no oversight and no reference to actual polling station results (Rawlence & Albin-Lackey 2007). Though I had heard of the widespread problems with the elections, I was interested in comparing these flawed election results with the flawed results from 1999 and 2003, if for no other reason than to see whether the areas where the ruling party had sufficient power to rig results changed over the course of the three election cycles (Kew 1999; Mole 2003).

When I e-mailed Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in search of state-level results just weeks after the 2007 elections I anticipated a failed delivery response. What I got back instead was a personal note from an INEC employee (see Figure 3). The presidential results at state level were not ready for publication but they would be available at some date in the near future. More than two years later the results are still unavailable.

IMPLICATIONS

For the researcher the result of both intentional and unintentional error is frustration. In a world where election analysis routinely requires sophisticated exit polling and an understanding of advanced statistics and/or geographic information systems, many African specialists are being pushed to the margins of electoral studies by a lack of data.

Information which is an e-mail or simple Internet search away for scholars interested in studying elections in other parts of the world, even when some of those elections took place centuries ago, in most African countries, even in best-case scenarios, requires significant outlays of time and money to collect. Under a far too common worst-case scenario, even after this time and money are outlaid the data being sought remain uncollected.

The solution to this dearth of data is quite simple. Electoral commissions can save and publish all their data through the government printer and, if the

resources exist to maintain a website, on the World Wide Web.⁸ At a minimum this data should be published at the legislative constituency level, but the expectations should be even higher. Is there a compelling reason not to make electoral data available at polling-station level? While punishment of opposition strongholds is not unheard of, in all likelihood the perpetrators of this potential harassment, namely agents of the government, have access to all the data withheld from the public. Allowing the rest of the world a peek at the detailed results would not seem to exacerbate this problem.

For reasons of embarrassment or fraud, however, electoral commissions across the continent have, by and large, chosen not to release detailed election results. This is where the international community can play an important role. While observers have a habit of condemning blatantly fraudulent elections, 'they frequently go relatively lightly on elections that, while not obviously fraudulent, nonetheless have significant flaws' (Carothers 1997, p 25). There is a great deal of pressure on domestic and international observers to make an early and strident declaration on the validity of election results, but waiting just a few days for detailed results to be made public would be a step in the right direction.

Probably less influential than election observers, but also less burdened by high-profile political pressures, are scholars interested in sub-national politics. In fraudulent elections it is doubtful that a researcher will be able to influence the government to produce detailed results and even less likely that these results will reflect accurately the will of the voting population.

In elections where the electoral commission is not actively engaged in fraud, however, changing the expectations and norms could make a considerable difference. In the tense days after an election partisans of the losing side already decry all kinds of real and/or imagined malfeasance. Releasing election results will do little to fan these flames and could, especially after electoral commissions gain a reputation for both sincerity and transparency, go a long way towards dampening allegations of wrongdoing before they reach fever pitch.

The social good that can come from even self-interested researchers pushing electoral commissions for more detailed data to test their hypotheses is potentially massive and goes well beyond the ramifications of scholarly output. Electoral commissions whose status quo position requires publishing aggregate results and hiding the constituent parts undercut the ability of citizens, especially those of low economic and social standing, to critique election results systematically.

8 South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission (<http://www.elections.org.za>) and Botswana's Independent Electoral Commission (<http://www.iec.gov.bw>) are the exceptions that will hopefully become the rule. Results can easily be accessed on their websites for the most recent national elections at voting district level. A few other countries (eg, Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia) have recently made efforts to publish data at sub-national level, which is a step in the right direction, but they have chosen to do so at a level substantially larger than the polling station.

Villagers might have a pretty good idea that their family, friends, and neighbours supported one party heavily over another, but when these votes are thrown hurriedly into a bin with votes from hundreds or thousands of other villages and towns the costs associated with figuring out whether the will of the people has been honoured increase dramatically. This status quo gives dishonest electoral commissions ample opportunity to defraud the public and makes honest electoral commissions look disturbingly like their dishonest counterparts.

Figure 1

Final Results of Sierra Leone's Presidential Run-off Released by the National Electoral Commission on 17 September 2007, with Hidden Columns Highlighted*



Republic of Sierra Leone
NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
PROGRESSIVE RUN-OFF ELECTION RESULTS



Final Results Summary

Updated 17 September, 2007 9:30

Tally Progress

National: 5679 of 5679 (100.0%) polling stations reported

District	Stations Reported	Stations Pending	% Reported
Kailahun	332	0	100.0%
Kenema	565	0	100.0%
Kono	408	0	100.0%
Bombali	495	0	100.0%
Kambia	314	0	100.0%
Koinadugu	336	0	100.0%
Port Loko	526	0	100.0%
Tonkolili	405	0	100.0%
Bo	444	0	100.0%
Bonthe	187	0	100.0%
Moyamba	285	0	100.0%
Pujehun	141	0	100.0%
WA Rural	251	0	100.0%
WA Urban	990	0	100.0%
National	5,679	-	100.0%

Turnout

National: 1,783,851 (68.1%) for reported polling stations

District	Voters	% Turnout
Kailahun	125,414	68.19
Kenema	197,350	72.82
Kono	130,771	72.51
Bombali	143,276	69.75
Kambia	78,301	58.11
Koinadugu	68,864	57.66
Port Loko	154,801	71.44
Tonkolili	117,511	69.33
Bo	145,707	60.64
Bonthe	49,843	68.58
Moyamba	78,900	64.96
Pujehun	42,023	42.67
WA Rural	80,336	70.86
WA Urban	370,754	75.31
National	1,783,851	68.09

Presidential Election by District

District	KOROMA (APC)	BEREWA (SLPP)	Berewa	Koroma	Berewa
Kailahun	11,631	111,695	37183	977	74,512
Kenema	32,666	160,699	25044	3005	135,655
Kono	52,908	74,458	2711	702	71,747
Bombali	125,419	14,095	365	6905	13,730
Kambia	61,250	14,449	36	3537	14,413
Koinadugu	42,178	23,130	2701	2480	20,429
Port Loko	132,287	17,789	252	605	17,537
Tonkolili	101,296	12,958	57	2393	12,901
Bo	37,006	105,459	46570	3910	58,889
Bonthe	20,018	28,313	675	80	27,638
Moyamba	26,485	49,886	7970	598	41,916
Pujehun	2,875	38,107	42688	2956	(4,581)
WA Rural	55,332	22,842	217	208	22,625
WA Urban	249,056	115,771	1620	948	114,151
National	950,407	789,651	168089	29004	621562

Summary of Votes by District

District	Valid Votes	Invalid Votes	Total Votes	Invalid To Remove	Total Invalid
Kailahun	123,326	2,088	125,414	385	2,473
Kenema	193,365	3,985	197,350	535	4,520
Kono	127,366	3,405	130,771	52	3,457
Bombali	139,514	3,762	143,276	136	3,898
Kambia	75,699	2,602	78,301	46	2,646
Koinadugu	65,308	3,556	68,864	111	3,667
Port Loko	150,076	4,725	154,801	14	4,739
Tonkolili	114,254	3,257	117,511	18	3,275
Bo	142,465	3,242	145,707	1392	4,634
Bonthe	48,331	1,512	49,843	27	1,539
Moyamba	76,371	2,529	78,900	88	2,617
Pujehun	40,982	1,041	42,023	740	1,781
WA Rural	78,174	2,162	80,336	9	2,171
WA Urban	364,827	5,927	370,754	1,60%	5,983
National	1,740,058	43,793	1,783,851	3609	43,793
					47,402

477 Stations have been invalidated due to more ballots than registered voters

Source: Information downloaded as a PDF file from the National Electoral Commission's website (<http://www.nec-sierraleone.org/>).

*The information in white on a black background was invisible on the original copy and appeared as if it was part of the blank paper. The hidden information is a remnant of an earlier draft of the report that was not fully sanitised. It was retrieved by opening the file in Adobe Photoshop and inserting a black box behind the white text.

Figure 2
 Report of Invalidated Votes in the Second Round of Sierra Leone's 2007 Presidential Elections, Released by the
 National Electoral Commission



**SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE INVALIDATED STATIONS IN THE
 PRESIDENTIAL RUN-OFF ELECTIONS SEPTEMBER 2007**



Srl No.	District	Total Polling Stations	Stations Reported	No of Stations Affected	Total Registered Voters Allocated to Affected Stations	Total Ballots Cast	Excess Votes Cast	Total Valid Votes	Invalid Votes	DISTRIBUTIONS OF VALID VOTES CAST			% Turn Out
										APC	SLPP		
1	Kailahun	422	332	90	38,273	39,043	770	38,655	388	977	37,678	102%	
2	Kono	630	565	65	27,078	28,584	1,506	28,049	535	3,005	25,044	106%	
3	Kenema	417	408	9	3,301	3,465	164	3,413	52	702	2,711	105%	
4	Bombali	512	495	17	6,856	7,106	250	6,970	136	6,605	365	104%	
5	Kambia	321	314	7	3,493	3,619	126	3,573	46	3,537	36	104%	
6	Koinadugu	349	336	13	4,513	5,292	779	5,181	111	2,480	2,701	117%	
7	Port Loko	528	526	2	850	871	21	857	14	605	252	102%	
8	Tonkolili	411	405	6	2,437	2,468	31	2,450	18	2,393	57	101%	
9	Bo	567	444	123	49,868	51,872	2,004	50,480	1,392	3,910	46,570	104%	
10	Bonthe	189	187	2	773	782	9	755	27	80	675	101%	
11	Moyamba	310	285	25	8,179	8,656	477	8,568	88	598	7,970	106%	
12	Pujehun	253	141	112	44,719	46,854	2,135	46,114	740	2,956	43,158	105%	
13	Western Rural	252	251	1	402	434	32	425	9	208	217	108%	
14	Western Urban	995	990	5	2,419	2,624	205	2,568	56	948	1,620	108%	
	Grand Total	6,156	5,679	477	193,161	201,670	8,509	198,058	3,612	29,004	169,054		

Source: The copy of the document depicted here was circulated on the Leonenet listserv (<http://www.leonenet.net/>)

Figure 3
e-mail Received from Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission

INEC <contact@inecnigeria.org>
To: kfridy@ut.edu
Re: Ticket 512, responded
Dear Kevin S. Fridy
Fri, May 18, 2007 at 11:33 AM

A new message has been added to the service request #512.

Hello Kevin,

Thank you for contacting INEC VCRC.

A state-by-state version of the result for the Presidential Election is not available online right now. However, detailed breakdown of all the approved results for the other elections are available at the same site.

More approved results are still being uploaded, please bear with us, we sincerely apologies for any inconvenience this might cause you.

Thank you

INEC Voter Contact and Response Center
09 222 INEC (4632)
09 780 9339

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